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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,

P et~tioner,
-vs.-

JAMES L. HATCH and DELLA L.
HATCH,
Respondents.

Case. No.
8937

PETITION FOR REHEARING AND
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF

PETITION FOR REHEARING
The State of Utah hereby petitions this Court for
a rehearing and reconsideration of this case on the following grounds :
I.
EXCHANGES WITH THE UNITED STATES CANNOT
LOGICALLY BE INCLUDED UNDER SECTION 65-1-14 AND
EXCLUDED UNDER SECTION 65-1-15.
II.
SECTION 65-1-15 IS NOT AMBIGUOUS AND ITS INTENT IS CLEAR.
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III.
NO EVIDENCE EXISTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE PRA·CTICES WHICH WOULD THWART THE PLAIN PURPOSE
OF THE LAW.
IV.
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION CONTEMPLATES DECISION BY FIVE JUDGES NOT FOUR JUDGES.

In support of the grounds above stated, the following
brief is submitted.
Respectfully,

WALTER L. BUDGE,
Attorney General, State of
Utah
DENNIS McCARTHY,
Special Assistant,
Counsel for Petitioner
I.
EXCHANGES WITH THE UNITED STATES CANNOT
LOGI·CALLY BE INCLUDED UNDER SECTION 65-1-14 AND
EXCLUDED UNDER SECTION 65-1-15.

The majority opinion disposes of this important case
by deciding but two issues. First, the majority decides
what it denominates a "prelinrinary question": Whether
the State Land Board has authority to exchange state
owned lands with the United States. To this an affirmative answer is given. Secondly, the 1najority determines
what it <·.ails •·the eritical question": "\Yhether in an exchange of state owned lands with the Federal GoYernment, minerals were reserved to the State subsequent
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to the enactment of Section 5575X, Laws of Utah 1919
(now Section 65-1-15, U.C.A., 1953). This is answered in
the negative.
A close examination of the rationale/ by which the
majority opinion reaches its· decision on each of these
questions is revealing. Consider first the preliminary
question, the authority of the State Land Board to
exchange lands with the United States. The majority
properly recognizes that authority for such a transaction
must be found in the state statutes. The opinion states:
"Such authority must be found in Sections 65-1-14,
65-1-27, 65-1-70, U.C.A., 1953." The opinion then quotes
the essential language of the first two sections, namely
65-1-14 and 65-1-27, apparently in the belief that these
two sections more nearly support its point of view. But
the third section, 65-1-70, is neither quoted nor discussed.
Indeed, after its initial citation, it seemingly disappears
forever from the case, since it is neither cited nor referred to again.
We must conclude, therefore, that the majority's
conclusion with respect to the source of authority of the
State Land Board is not seriously based upon the provisions of 65-1-70. As pointed out in appellant's prior
briefs, at the time of the exchange transaction involved
in this case, Section 65-1-70 (formerly Section 5618) provided that "no exchange shall be made by the land board
until a patent for the land so received in exchange shall
have been issued by the government of the United States
to such proprietors or their grantors." It is obvious that
the statute neither contemplates nor authorizes an ex-
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change of lands with the United States itself. Further,
the statute's limited authority is restricted to situations
where the exchange is necessary "in order to compact ...
the land holdings of the state," whereas the undisputed
evidence in this case contradicts that any purpose "to
compact" was involved. Perhaps these considerations
deterred the majority opinion from quoting or seriously
relying upon 65-1-70 as a source of power for the State
Land Board.
Apparently, the majority felt, however, that some
reliance could be placed upon Section 65-1-27 (formerly
Section 5580) as a source of authority, since the essential
provisions of this statute are quoted as follows: " ... The
land board is hereby empowered to cancel, relinquish, or
release the claims of the state to, and to reconvey to the
United States, any particular tract of land erroneously
listed to the state, or any tract upon which, at the time
of selection, a bona fide claim has been initiated by an
actual settler." Without ambiguity, the grant of authority
contained in this section is strictly limited to two situations (1) to land erroneously listed to the state, and
(2) to land on which a bona fide elaiin has been initiated
by an actual settler. Nothing could be n1ore specific. The
statutory language does not touch upon or refer, in even
the re1notest sense. to any grant of power to the State
Land Board to Inake exchanges of state owned school
sections with the Federal GoYennnent. It seen1s inconceivable that the three able judges who joined in the
majority opinion could haYt> placed much reliance, if any
at all, upon Section 6!l-1-27 as eonstituting the necessary
grant of authority to the State Land Board.
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We believe that the majority op1n1on necessarily
must have relied primarily upon the provisions of Section
65-1-14 as constituting the source of the authority of the
State Land Board. In 1925, the date here pertinent, that
statute read as follows :
"Section 5575. Control of State lands-lease
-sellJ etc.-reserve. The State land board shall
have the direction, management and control of all
lands heretofore, or which may hereafter be
granted to this State, by the United States government, or otherwise ... for any and all purposes
whatsoever ... , and shall have the power to sell
or lease the same for the best interests of the
State and in accordance with the provisions of
this chapter and the constitution of this State;
... And provided, further, that in all cases lands
containing coal or other minerals shall be reserved
from sale... " (1925 Session Laws of Utah, Chap.
31, Sec. 5575)
We agree with the majority opinion that the above
quoted section and its companion section, Sec. 5575X2
(now 65-1-17) relating to the authority of the State Land
Board to sell the surface of state owned lands, probably
constitute the basic authority - if any exists - of the
State Land Board to make an exchange of lands with
the United States. Certainly, if the Land Board has such
authority, it must be found within the framework of
these two sections, 65-1-14 and 65-1-17.
But assuming this interpretation of the pertinent
statutes by the majority opinion, certain conclusions
inevitably must follow. Sections 65-1-14 and 65-1-17 confer no express authority on the State Land Board to
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exchange lands with the Federal Government. Certainly,
the language of 65-1-14 giving the Board the "direction,
management, and control" of state lands falls short of
conferring the necessary authority to make such an exchange. In fact, the only express authority contained in
65-1-14 to alienate state lands, either the fee or the
surface, consists in the conferred power to "sell." Necessarily, it must be assumed, therefore, that the majority
opinion implicitly concludes that the power to "sell"
conferred on the Land Board by the two cited sections
includes an "exchange" with the United States. And we
agree - so far as surface rights to state owned lands
are concerned. The limited number of decisions in point,
tend to support such a construction of the word "sell."
Newton v. State Board of Land Commissioners, 37 Idaho
58, 219 Pac. 1053; Bridgforth v. Middleton, 184 Miss. 632,
186 So. 837.
The majority opm1on then turns to the "critical
question" whether Section 5575X (now 65-1-15) applies
to an exchange of state owned lands with the Federal
Government. Here the ·majority reaches a diametrically
opposite conclusion from the logical implications of the
answer given to the "prelilninary question" with respect
to the authority of the State Land Board. The majority
interprets Sections 5575X as not including an exchange
with the United States. In so detennining, the 1najority
necessarily reverses the very reasoning in1plicit in its
conclu~ion that a ''sale" under Section 5575 includes an
exchange with the United States.
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Section 5575X states :
"All coal and other mineral deposits in lands
belonging to the State are hereby reserved to the
State. Such deposits are reserved from sale except upon a rental and royalty basis as herein
provided and the purchaser of any land belonging
to the State shall acquire no right, title or interest
in or to sueh deposits ... " (1919 Session Laws of
Utah, Chap. 107, Sec. 5575X)
It is to be noted that Sections 5575, 5575X and
5575X2 all were enacted by the 1919 Legislature as a
comprehensive single chapter of laws relating to the
"control of state lands." Since they were enacted as companion statutes, they must be read together and construed together. They are in pari materia in every sense
of that term. If the power of the Land Board in Section
5575 to "sell" state lands includes an exchange of lands
with the Federal Government, then the reservation of
mineral deposits from "sale'' in Section 5575X cannot
logically be read to exclude such an exchange. A "sale''
under 5575 cannot include an exchange with the United
States, and a "sale" under 5575X exclude an exchange
with the United States, without doing violence to the
entire statutory scheme. In so construing these related
sections, the majority opinion is unsound and illogical,
we respectfully submit.
It is significant that Section 5575 (65-1-14), the very
section which the majority opinion cites as the authority
of the State Land Board to make exchanges with the
Federal Government, itself contains a mineral reservation. By its terms it reserves from "sale" "i;n all cases
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lands containing coal or other minerals." If, as the majority opinion holds, Section 5575 authorizes exchanges
with the Federal Government, would the majority opinion
also exclude exchanges with the Federal Government
under Section 5575 of lands known to be mineral, notwithstanding the language expressly reserving such lands
from "sale"~ To do so would violate the clear statutory
intent. So also, to construe similar language reserving
all mineral deposits from "sale'' under 5575X as excluding exchanges with the United States just as clearly
would be contrary to the manifest legislative intent.
It is of interest to note that the 1959 Session of the
Utah Legislature, in reenacting Section 65-1-15 added the
following provision:
"A.nd provided further that, when making indeinnity selections using \ested school lands as
base, the board (State Land Board) may- release
to the United States the state's mineral interests
in the base lands provided the state acquires the
nuneral interests in the selected public domain.''
(Laws of rtah, 195~1. Chap. 131, See. 65-1-15)
Her0 again, the intent of these related statutes is made
elear. lf the sweeping 1nineral reservation of 5515:S:
(now ();)-1-1;)) ha.d been intended not to apply to e:s:ehanges with the Federal GoYerninent, it certainly was
unn<'<'<'~~:u·~· for the leg-islature in E15~1 to enact a
~tatut<' <'xpn'~~~~- empow·ering the State Land Board
to n'l<'a~<' t]w stah' ·~ interest in n1inerals in exchanges
with tiH' f1\'dt'ral Oon'rmnent. If, as the Inajorit~- opinion
hold~. ~<'dion 65-1-15 pennits exchanges with the Federal
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Government without a mineral reservation, the 1959
amendment scarcely need have been enacted. Obviously,
the legislature thought the 1959 amendment necessary,
for the reason that it considered Section 65-1-15 as
it existed did not authorize exchanges with the Federal
Government without a mineral reservation.

II.
SECTION 65-1-15 IS NOT AMBIGUOUS AND ITS INTENT IS CLEAR.

As stated, the majority opinion determines the socalled "critical" question in this case by concluding that
the mineral reservation statute, Section 5575X, Laws of
Utah 1919 (now 65-1-15, U.C.A. 1953) does not include
exchanges of vested state lands with the United States.
According to the majority, this conclusion in turn is
based on a "look to its (the statute's) purpose in the
light of its history and background." Laying aside for
the moment the merits of the so-called "history and
background" cited, let us examine the legal principle
which sanctions such a look at the "history and background."
It is simple hornbook law that legislative history
and background may be resorted to in construing a
statute only if the statute is ambiguous. 50 Am. Jur.,
Statutes §225. Is the statute here involved in that category~ The first sentence of the statute reads:

"All coal and other mineral deposits in land
belonging to the state are hereby reserved to the
state ... "
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Wherein is the ambiguity in this simple, straightforward,
all inclusive sentence~ Would it be less ambiguous if it
read:
"All coal and other mineral deposits in land
belonging to the state are hereby reserved to the
state, including the minerals in state owned school
sections exchanged with the Federal Government."
\Ve submit that the suggested addition adds no meanIng to the statute not fully contained in the language
used. Either the reservation means what it says or it
means nothing. No research into history or background
is necessary to explore its meaning. It means what the
words in their slinple, ordinary and customary usage
clearly state - that all minerals in lands belonging to
the state are hereby reserved to the state. In the light
of the plain meaning and obvious intent of this unambiguous reservation, we submit that the majority opinion
errs in attempting to read an exception into the statute
by consulting "history and background" to determine the
statute's "correct application."
Let us now consider the ·"history and background"
relied upon by the Inajorit~~ opinion. Disappointingly. we
find it consists of nothing n1ore than a report by a ComInittee (not even a legislative connnittee) appointed by
the then Governor in 1917. to conduct an audit and
investigation of state agencies. inc.luding an1ong others
the State Land Board, to uncover discrepancies in the
management and disposition of public funds. The Committee's subsequent report to the Governor, among other
things, cited examples of favoritis1n practiced b~~ the
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Land Board in making sales of state lands to certain
individuals and contained suggestions for elimination of
this practice. The report also recommended that the sale
of all state lands be suspended for five years. It contained no reference to exchanges of land with the Federal Government, except an incidental suggestion that the
state should take steps to secure favorable national legislation to permit the exchange of worthless school sections
within forest reserves.
The mineral reservation statute, Section 5575X was
enacted by the 1919 Legislature soon after the submission
of this report to the Governor. As stated by the majority
opinion, the report "contains no suggestion or intimation
that anything was amiss in the exchanges with the federal
government." From the fact of this omission, the majority then leaps to the conclusion, that "it is quite
apparent that the legislature intended no such (mineral)
reservation in such exchanges (with the United States)."
In all candor, we respectfully ask whether this is
a fair and reasonable deduction to make as to probable
legislative intent with respect to the sale or other disposition of state owned lands to the Federal Government~
The legislature obviously rejected the suggestion of the
Governor's committee for a moritorium on the sale of
state lands, but instead enacted an all inclusive mineral
reservation statute. Because a committee's report to the
Governor fails to mention anything concerning exchanges
with the Federal Government, does it really become
"quite apparent" from such omission that the legislature
intended to exclude exchanges with the Federal Govern-
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ment notwithstanding the inclusive language of the
statute~ Significantly, the report involved is not even a
report of a legislative committee, but of a committee
appointed by a Governor two years previous. The report
in no way concerns itself with the subject of a reservacion of minerals in state owned lands. It is entirely silent
with respect to the matter of whether minerals should
be reserved in transactions with the Federal Government
or any one else. Surely, evidence of legislative intent
must be based on less flimsy stuff than this !
If legislative intent is to be explored to such length,
why does the majority opinion fail even to mention the
one solid fact of legislative history that is available~ As
pointed out in appellant's Reply Brief, the 1919 Senate
Journal contains a significant notation with respect to
Section 5575X. The original bill was S.B. X o. 58. On page
267 of the Senate Journal is the following notation:
"Committee on Public Affairs recommends
Bill for passage - with certain amendments.
1. On p. 2 beginning on line 7 strike out the
following words: 'except as otherwise expressly
authorized b)~ law.' ,.
The Sessions Laws of Utah 1919, Chapter 107, page 30~.
probably sets forth the bill in approxiinatel~~ the same
format as the original bill (no copy of the original bill
is obtainable). Lines 7 and 8, page 2 of the bill as set
forth in the Session Laws. contain the first sentence of
the all inclusive 1nineral reservation, reading: ··~ill coal
and other mineral deposits in lands belonging to the
state are hereby reserved by the state.,. 'Yithout doubt,
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the phrase "except as otherwise expressly authorized by
law" was a proposed modifying clause following the
first sentence of the quoted statute. The striking of this
phrase from the first sentence, certainly is clear evidence
that the legislature intended no exceptions or limitations
to its all inclusive general reservation.
Under the interpretation the majority gives to Section 65-1-15, the statute permits the conveyance of
minerals in state owned lands in transactions with the
United States, while at the same time prohibiting such
conveyances and transactions with other persons or entities. Such a construction obviously results in an unwarranted discrimination in favor of the United States,
and is in violation of Article 1, Section 24 of the Utah
Constitution which requires that "all laws of a general
nature shall have a uniform operation." Even though
there might be circumstances under which the legislature
might differentiate between an exchange of lands with
the United States and an exchange with a private person,
such differentiation would have to find a reasonable basis
in terms of statutory language. Here the statute set8
forth no basis for any such discrimination, and it contains no restrictions nor exceptions whatsoever with
respect to its application.
What the majority opinion does is to take a statute
(65-1-15) which is clear and unambiguous on its face,
and read into it an exception in favor of the Federal
Government. This we respectfully submit is unadulterated judicial legislation. Apparently, the majority indulge

'
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in such legislative expediency because of its fear of the
consequences or the upsetting effects of a decision which
would confirm a literal reading of the statute. In Newton
v. State Board of Land Commissoiners, 37 Idaho 58, 319
Pac. 1053, the Idaho Supreme Court had the same problem, but instead of "ducking" it by twisting an exception
into the law, it faced up to the literal language of the
state law, regardless of what "confusion in the titles to
lands" might result from its ruling. \Ye respectfully
suggest that it is not for this Court to worry about the
possible effects of its decision, but to apply the law as
it exists. The legislature, not the Court should make
changes if any are needed.
III.
NO EVIDENCE EXISTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES WHICH WOULD THWART THE PLAIN PURPOSE
OF THE LAW.

The majority opinion concludes with what is seemingly believes is a clinching statement:
"When the Land Board, our legislature, the
United States and lando·wners succeeding to its
interests have all treated such exchanges as Yesting fee title in the lTnited States for a period of
nearly 40 years, it would seen1 1nanifestly unfair
to now pennit the state to assert that it had re~erved the 1nineral rights in all such lands."
W 0 respectfully challengf' the factual basis for this statement. There i~ not a scintilla of eYidence in the reeord
of the ease before the Court, nor in any records of the
Land Board of whieh judicial notice 1uay be taken, whic.h
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indicates that the Land Board regarded such exchanges
as vesting fee title in the United States. True, the Selection Lists and Approved Lists are silent with respect
to any mineral reservation, but the mere silence of these
legal instruments cannot be considered as evidence that
the Land Board "treated such exchanges as vesting fee
title in the United States." In fact, successive opinions
by several Utah State Attorneys General since 1931 addressed to the State Land Board or its employees are
squarely to the contrary. Several of these opinions are
reprinted as an Appendix to this brief. In the face of
these opinions, it is inconceivable that the Land Board
thought it conveyed or intended to convey a fee title
without a mineral reservation, in exchanges of vested
school sections with the Federal Government.
Where also is the evidence is this case or the available legislative history which indicates that the state
legislature has "treated such exchanges as vesting title
in the United States"~ As demonstrated in our several
briefs, the clear and unambiguous intent of the pertinent
statutes is to the contrary. So also is the legislative
history to the extent it exists as herein pointed out.
vVhere is the evidence of facts which establish that
the United States and landowners succeeding to ih;
interest have "treated such exchanges as vesting fee title
in the United States"~ Except for the self-serving assertions to that effect by counsel for the respondents and
counsel for the United States and the other amicus
parties, we submit that the record in this case and otherwise is barren of any such evidence.
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The majority opinion also refers to certain other
Utah statutes which it claims substantiate its conclusion
with respect to the administrative practice of dealing
with state owned lands. One such statute referred to is
a 1927 Act authorizing the State Land Board to convey
certain lands to the United States for use as a Migratory
Bird Refuge (Chapter 56, Section 1, Laws of Utah, 1927).
The majority points to the fact that this Act expressly reserves minerals and therefore indicates an
intent that general statutes such as 65-1-15 do not require
such a reservation where the United States is involved.
But Chapter 56, Section 1, Laws of Utah, 1927, was not
enacted for the special purpose of making an express
mineral reservation. The Act authorized the conveyance
of specified lands to the United States either as a sale
or a gift. The Utah statutes did not then and do not now
authorize either a gift or a sale of lands even to the
United States, except in the manner provided by law.
Section 65-1-29, which was in force at the time of the
said special act, prescribed a definite procedure for the
sale of state lands including an appraisal and a sale at
not less than the appraised values. Chapter 56 was
necessary, therefore, not for the purpose of 1naking a
reservation of 1ninerals, but rather for the purpose of
authorizing the basic transaction. \Yithout a special act
the State could not have conveyed the lands under the
circumstances. In addition, the special act was required
in order to make it clear that the conveyance was made
on the condition that Senate Bill 5454, then pending
before Congress, or a like bill, be enacted. In the same
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sessiOn of the legislature, a resolution was adopted
1nemorializing Congress to pass Senate Bill 5454, providing for a proposed reclamation project in the Bear
Lake area.
In the light of the foregoing, it is not fair to infer
from the enactment of Chapter 56, a legislative intent
that general statutes such as 65-1-15 do not require a
reservation of minerals in transactions with the United
States. The same statute, Chapter 56, was referred to
in an opinion by the Attorney General of the State of
Utah, George P. Parker, dated 1\fay 28, 1931, as evidencing an intention on the part of the legislature that
minerals be reserved to the State. The opinion states:
"Right here it is interesting to note Chapter
56, Laws of 1927, by the provisions of which the
legislature authorized the State Land Board to
convey to the United States title to certain lands
in the vicinity of the mouth of Bear River... Such
condition is indicative of the determination of the
legislature to safeguard the minerals of the State.
I cannot find that the legislature has ever authorized any State Land Board to waive minerals
to the United States in lands selected but since
the year 1919 when the State mineral reservation
Act became effective, it has been the policy of
the State to reserve all minerals to itself and to
dispose of them only by lease."
The majority opinion also refers to two statutes
enacted in 1929. The footnote to the majority opinion
refers to both acts as Chapter 2, Section 1, Laws of Utah,
1929. Apparently this is an inadvertent error. Chapter
2, Section 1 of the Laws of 1929, is an Act whereby the
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State authorizes the acquisition by the United States
by purchase, gift or lease, of certain areas of land or
water for the establishment and maintenance of Bear
River Migratory Bird Refuge. Chapter 2, Section 2 expressly reserves the mineral rights to the State of ctah.
The primary purpose of this special legislation, like the
purpose of Chapter 56, Laws of 1927, was to permit a
gift or sale of lands which would not otherwise be allowed by state law. As stated, the Utah laws at that
time did not permit a gift of lands and permitted a sale
only on the terms set forth in Section 65-1-29, U.C.A.,
1953, and its predecessor acts. Clearly, the purpose of
the Bird Refuge Act was to permit the basic transaction,
not to permit a reservation of minerals. The other Act
which the majority opinion apparently has reference to,
Chapter 1, of the Laws of l~tah, 1929, authorized the
State to quit claim to the lTnited States of ~lmerica,
without cost, certain lands located in Township 3 North,
Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base & Jieridian. This special
legislation was again required for the smne reasons set
forth above. No provision was n1ade therein for the
reservation of minerals.
The Inajorit~~ opinion states that the only conclusion
to be drawn fron1 the express 1nineral reservations and
on1issions in these special enachnents is that the legislature and the Land Board did not consider the 1919
mineral re~wrvation applicable to the Federal GovernInent. We sub1nit that the n1ore reasonable conclusion is
that such special t)~pe legislation. considered in light of
the Utah statutes whieh did not authorize a gift of lands
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and authorized a sale only for an appraised consideration, is that the legislation was necessary in order to
authorize the basic transaction, i.e., to permit a conveyance of the surface rights. The inclusion or ommission of
a mineral reservation was merely incidental.
But even if there were factual and evidentiary support for the quoted statement in the majority opinion
concerning past administrative practices, we submit such
a course of conduct on the part of the Land Board or
the other administrative officers or agents involved
would not be material. School section lands such as here
involved are held by the State of Utah in trust, in its
governmental capacity. Van Wagoner v. Whitmore, 58
Utah 418, 422, 199 Pac. 670, 679. It follows that the
state would not be bound by any unauthorized acts
of its officers or agents in connection with the disposition
of such lands. State v. District Court of Fourth Judicial
District, 51 N.M. 297, 183 P.2d 607; Newton v. State
Board of Land Commissioners, 37 Idaho 58, 219 Pac.
1053. Compare also the opinion of the United States
Supreme Court in the famous "tidelands" suit, United
States v. State of California, 332 U. S. 19, 39-40, 67 Sup.
Ct. 1658, 1668-1969. And as stated by the Supreme Court
in United States v. City and County of San Franci·sco,
310 U. S. 16, 31-32, 60 Sup. Ct. 749, 757:
". . . We cannot accept the contention that
administrative rulings- such as those here relied
on - can thwart the plain purpose of a valid law.
As to estoppel, it is enough to repeat that ' ... the
United States is neither bound nor estopped by
acts of its officers or agents in entering into an
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arrangement or agreement to do or cause to be
done what the law does not sanction or permit.' "
In its concluding sentences the majority opinion
assumes a philosophical attitude concerning the decision
reached and indicates that a contrary decision would
cause confusion, chaos and unfairness in land titles. It
is intimated that for this reason the wording of 65-1-15
should not be taken at its face value and given its ordinary
and literal meaning - that the legislature of the State
of Utah intended to preserve for the citizens of the State
an inalienable interest in all minerals discovered under
lands owned by the State. If such were the legislative
intent, however, is it not "unfair" to warp the meaning
of 65-1-15 by inserting therein an exception which is
contrary to its own terms and thereby permit an illegal
appropriation of state property and a deprivation of its
use and benefits in so far as the residents of the State
are concerned~ Such an "unfairness~~ is particularly significant when, as the Inajorit:- opinion itself recognizes,
the lands \vhich the State of 1Jtah received in exchange
for its vested school sections had been deternrined to
be non-1nineral in character. In other words, is it fair
to approve a systen1 of exchanges under circun1stances
where the Federal Govern1nent as an exchangor receiYed
mineral right frmn the State of lTtah, but the State of
Utah received onl~- lands detennined to be non-1nineral,
even though surface values were considered equin1lent 1
Furthennore, it 1nust be realized that in any judicial
proceeding dealing with titles one party n1ust lose and
one party must win. That which is "fair" in the nrind
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of the prevailing party often seems "unfair" to the other
party. Despite this personal approach, the American
Judicial System always has recognized that that which
is "fair'' is an impartial judicial decision predicated upon
law and not upon sympathy nor upon what seem to be
resultant complexities or vexing problems. Our judicial
system has been criticized most in those situations where
courts, for sociological, political or other convenient
reasons, have strayed from a purely judicial approach
to arrive at results which seemingly are consistent with
the times or the present political temper. In so doing,
it has not been uncommon for courts to utilize statutory
interpretation as a device to make a statute appear to
say exactly what it does not say. In utilizing this approach, statutory interpretation becomes the sceptre by
which some courts suddenly become endowed with legislative powers. Certainly, by the process of utilizing
statutory interpretation to make 65-1-15 state that
minerals shall not be reserved in exchanges with the
United States, when in fact section 65-1-15 clearly and
unmistakably states that all minerals shall be reserved,
constitutes a legislative amendment to the statute which
the 1919 and even the 1959 legislature would not have
adopted.
IV.
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION CONTEMPLATES DECISION BY FIVE JUDGES NOT FOUR JUDGES.

This case was heard and argued before a full Court
of five judges. Only four judges actually participated in
the decision, however, by reason of the death of Judge
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Worthen between the time of argument and the filing
of the opinion. The present decision was rendered by
three judges with one judge dissenting.
Although Section 2, Article VIII of the Utah Constitution provides that: "A majority of the judges constituting the court shall be necessary to form a quorum
or render a decision," it is clear also that the Constitution
contemplates that the full complement of five judges
should hear and participate in the decision. This is
made evident by the provision of Section 2, Article VIII
of the Constitution stating that: "If a justice of the
supreme court shall be disqualified from sitting in a
cause before said court, the remaining judges shall call
a district judge to sit with them on the hearing of such
cause." (Emphasis supplied)
This Constitutional provision obviously contemplates
that, absent a stipulation of the parties agreeing to a
lesser number of judges, the litigants are entitled to a
decision by five qualified judges. In this case, one of
the five judges beca1ne disqualified by death prior to
the decision of the Court. See In re Thompson's Estate,
72 Utah 17, 86, 269 Pac. 103, 128. holding that "disqualification" 1nay include the death of a judge. The
parties before the Court in the case at bar did not agree
nor stipulate to a decision by only four judges. ruder
the circun1stanees, we submit that the Court should have
called a district judge, as directed by the 1nandatory
language of the Constitution, to sit with the rest of the
Court and to participate in the decision.
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It may be argued that Section 2, Article VIII
permits a "majority" of the court "to form a quorun1
or render a decision" and that in this case a majority
of three did render a decision. But a fair reading of
the Constitutional provision indicates that the reference
is to a majority out of five judges, not to a majority
out of four judges. It is well known in connection with
the judicial process that a court decision represents the
composite thinking of all members of the Court, presumably resulting from an exchange of arguments and
ideas between all of its members. It is entirely possible
that a majority out of five judges might emerge with a
very different result, than would a majority out of four
judges. Who can say what influence or persuasion the
missing jurist might not exert on his fellow judges~
Even if the intent of the Constitutional provision
were otherwise doubtful, we respectfully suggest that in
a case as important as this, and in which the consequences
are so serious and far-reaching, this Court should not
render a landmark decision without the benefit of a full
complement of its membership.

CONCLUSION
As this Court is well aware, the issues in this case
have far-reaching significance and importance. At stake
is nothing less than the right of the citizens of the
State of Utah to a royalty interest in oil and gas and
other mineral properties worth many millions of dollars.
The chief beneficiaries of such rights are the public

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24

schools of the state, in part supported by the revenues
from state school sections involved in this dispute.
Although these considerations alone should not, of course,
be determinative of the outcome of the case, they do
constitute good reason why this Court should arrive at
a final judgment only after the most thorough and
thoughtful judicial consideration of the issues presented.
It is the earnest belief of the State of Utah that the
majority opinion does not correctly resolve these legal
issues, and that the importance of the case justifies a
reconsideration by a full Court. For the reasons herein
set forth, a rehearing is respectfully requested.
Respectfully,

WALTER L. BUDGE,
Attorney General, State of
Utah
DEXXIS :JicC~-\.HTHY,
Special .Assistant,
Counsel for Petitioner
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APPENDIX
THE STATE OF UTAH
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
SALT LAKE CITY
May 28, 1931
(SEAL)
George P. Parker
Attorney General
Lawrence A. Miner
Byron D. Anderson
M. Logan Rich
Wm. A. Hilton
Deputies

State Board of Land Commissioners,
State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
Gentlemen:
In connection with "Indemnity School Land List
049123," filed April 1, 1930, wherein the State of Utah
selected the E¥2 of the SE%j of Section 11, the SE1;4 of
the NW1;4 of Section 12, Twp. 37 South, Range 11 West
of the Salt Lake Meridian, and the SE1;4 of the SE1;4 of
Section 27, Twp. 17 South, Range 16 East of the Salt
Lake Meridian, containing 160 acres, and offered to
exchange therefor Lots 1 and 2 of the S:lf2 of the SE1;4
of Section 16, Twp. 22 South, Range 2 East of the Salt
Lake Meridian, containing 160 acres, embraced in the
Fish Lake National Forest, you refer to me letter addressed by the Commissioner of the General Land Office
to the Register of the U. S. Land Office at Salt Lake
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City, Utah, under date of September 15, 1930, wherein
the Commissioner rules that unless the State of Utah
furnishes a written coal consent under the acts of June
22, 1910 (36 Stats. 583) and April 30, 1912, (37 Stats.
105) as to the SE1;4 of the SE1;4 of Section 27, Twp. 17
South, Range 16 East of the Salt Lake Meridian, the
lease will be held for rejection, and by reason thereof
you request me to advise you whether or not in my
opinion the State Land Board is authorized by our law
to waive mineral rights to the United States in lands
so selected and take only surface rights in such lands
for the surrender of full title to the base lands.
A discussion of the laws under which r tah acquired
title to its school lands in place and also of its right
to surrender base lands and select other lands in lieu
thereof, and the powers of the State Land Board in
relation to such lands is necessary to reach a conclusion.
By Utah's Enabling . ..\.ct (:28 Stats. 107) the state
was granted Sections 2, 16, 3:2 and 36 in each township
of the state for the support of its connnon schools, and
where such sections, or any parts thereof, had been sold
or otherwise disposed of by the l~nited States. other
lands equivalent thereto were and are granted to the
State h~T the Act. The Act further provides that any of
such sections embraced in pennanent reservations shall
not at an~· tin1e be subject to the grant nor to the indenlnity provisions of the Act until the reservation shall
have lwPn extinguished and such lands restored to the
public domain.
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It will be observed that Utah's Enabling Act did not
give this state the right to select other lands in lieu
of Sections 2, 16, 32, and 36, or parts thereof, where
the United States had, prior to survey, disposed of
them, or parts thereof, and where said sections were
mineral lands included in any reservation. But by the
provisions of the Act of May 3, 1902 (32 Stats. 188) the
provisions of the school land indemnity Act (26 Stats.
796, Act of February 28, 1891) were made to apply to
the State of Utah. The School land indemnity Act provides, among other things, that in all cases where the
United States has disposed of school sections in place
prior to survey or any such sections are included in any
Indian, Military or other reservation or are mineral
lands other lands of equal acreage are appropriated and
granted, and out of them the State may select within its
boundaries nonmineral surveyed lands in lieu of those
thus disposed of or included in reservations. But the
State, by the Act, has a right to await the extinguishment
of any reservation and then take the sections in place
therein.
Thus, it will be seen, the State's right of selection
definitely established. The right, however, (prior to
the Act of January 25, 1927) is a restricted one, because
under the school land indemnity Act the State could not
select known mineral lands and under the State's Enabling Act, as construed by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of United States vs. Sweet,
245 U. S. 563, the grant did not include lands of known
mineral character. Under the law as thus established it i:3
IS
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palpably clear that whenever the State surrenders its
titled school tract, it has the unconditional right to select
a tract of equal acreage in lieu thereof, and the only element to be dealt with in the selection (prior to the Act
of January 25, 1927) is whether or not at the time of such
selection the selected lands are of known mineral character. If such is true then the state has no right to theselected lands. If the contrary is true then the State's right
to the selected lands is absolute. The rights of the States
under the school lands indemnity Act have been passed
upon by the Supreme Court of the L nited States in
several recent cases. In the case of \Yyonring vs. United
States, 255 U. S. 489, the facts were approximately as
follows:
"The State of \\~yoming \\aived its right to
a school tract in a reservation and selected in
lieu thereof a tract of equal acreage from the
public lands within the state and outside of the
reservation, and it performed e\ery act \\hich -was
required of it in ,,~aiTing its base lands and selecting the lieu lands. The list remained in the General
Land Office awaiting consideration for upwards
of three ~~ears. In the n1eantime (two years after
the selection) the selected laud, \'lith other lands,
were included in a te1nporary executive withdrRwal a; po:::sihle oil laud under the ~~ct of June
2G, 1910. The Connnissioner tl1en con1ing to consider the selection declined to approve it as made
nnd c>alled upon the State to either accept a limited,
- surface-right, - certification of the selected
land or to show cause that it still was not known
or believed to be Inineral. The State declined to
accede to either alternatiYe and insisted that its
rights should be deter1nined as of the tin1e ·when
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the waiver and selection were made, and, after
applying that test, it became invested with the
equitable title to the selected land two years prior
to the temporary withdrawal, and at a time when
that land was neither known or believed to be
mineral. The Commissioner thereupon ordered
the selection cancelled, not because it was in any
respects objectionable when made, but on the
theory that he was justified in rejecting it by
reason of the subsequent withdrawal and subsequent oil discoveries in that vicinity. In the meantime the State had given a lease permitting the
lessee to drill the selected land. There was no
drilling or oil discovery at the time the lease was
given, but thereafter drilling was prosecuted at a
large cost and carried to a successful production
of oil, which was four years after the selection."
The Supreme Court in passing upon the rights of
the State under the facts as above stated made the following cogent remarks and rulings:
"At that time (time of selection) the State
had a perfect title to the tract in the reserve and
the land selected in lieu thereof was vacant, unappropriated and neither known or believed to
be mineral. The list fully conformed to the directions on the subject issued by the Secretary
of the Interior and was accompanied by the requisite proofs and the proper fees. Notice of selection
was duly posted and published, proof thereof was
duly made and the state paid the publisher's
charge. Thus, * * * the state did everything
necessary to show a perfect title to the land relinquished and perfect relinquishment thereof to
the Government, and everything that was required
either by statute or by regulation of the Land
Department in selecting the lieu land instead of
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the relinquished tract * * *. The question presented is whether, considering that the selection
was lawfully made in lieu of the state owned tract
contemporaneously relinquished, and that nothing
remained to be done by the state to perfect the
selection, it was admissable for the Commissioner
and the Secretary to disapprove and reject it on
the ground that the selected land was withdrawn
two years later under the Act of June 25, 1910,
and still later was discovered to be mineralland,that is, to be valuable for oil. Or, putting it in anther way, the question is whether it was admissable for those officers to test the validity of the
selection by the changed conditions when they
came to examine it, instead of by the conditions
existing when the state relinquished the tract in
the forest reserve and selected the other in its
stead."
"In principle it is plain that the validity of
the selection should be determined as of the time
when it was made when it ,,~as made: that is, according to the conditions then existing. The proposal for the exchange of land "ithout, for land
within the reserve ca1ne fron1 Congress. Acceptance rested with the State, and controlled by the
conditions existing at the tilne. It is not as if the
selection was 1nerel~~ a proposal by the state which
the land officers could accept or reject. They had
no such option to exercise. but were charged \nth
the dut~r of ascertaining whether the State's
waiver and selection 1net the require1nents of the
congressional proposal, and of giving or \\ithholding their approYal accordingly. The power confided to then1 "\Yas not that of granting or denying
a privilege to the State, but of detern1ining
whether an existing priYileg-e conferred bY Congress had been lawfnll)T exer~ised,-in other 'words,
their action was to be judicial in its nature and
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directed to an ascertainment and declaration of
the effect of the waiver and selection by the State
in 1912. If these were valid then,-if they met all
the requirements of the congressional proposal including the directions given by the Secretary, they remained valid notwithstanding the subsequent change in conditions. Acceptance of such a
proposal, and full compliance therewith, confer
vested rights which all must respect. Equity then
regards the State as the owner of the selected
tract, and the United States as owning the other;
and this equitable ownership carried with it whatever of advantage or disadvantage may arise from
a subsequent change in conditions, whether one
tract or the other be affected. Of course, the
State's right under the selection was precisely the
same as if, in 1912, it had made a cash entry of
the selected land under an applicable statute; for
the waiver of its right to the tract in the forest
reserve was the equivalent of a cash consideration.
And yet it hardly would be suggested that the
Commissioner or the Secretary, on coming to consider the cash entry, could do otherwise than approve it, if, at the time it was made, the land
was open to such an entry, and the amount paid
was the lawful price. * * *"
"The Land DP-partment uniformly has ruled
that the States acquire a vested right in all school
sections in place which are not otherwise appropriated, and not known to be mineral, at the
time they are identified by the survey,-or at the
date of the grant~ where the survey precedes it,regardless of ',vhen the matter becomes a subject
of inquiry and decision, and that this right is not
defeated or affected by a subsequent mineral
discovery. And, as respects cash entries and
entries under the pre-emption, homestead, desert
land, and kindrd laws, the Land Department
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always had ruled that if, when the claimant has
done all that he is required to do to entitle him to
receive the title, the land is not known _to be
mineral, he acquires a vested right which no subsequent discovery of mineral will divest or
disturb. And this rule has been applied by that
Department, although not uniformly, to selections
made in lieu of relinquished lands in public reservations. Thus, in Kern Oil Co. v. ·Clark, 30 Land
Dec. 550, where a lieu selection under the Act of
June 4, 1897, chap. 2, 30 Stats. at L. 36, 9 Fed.
Stats. Anno. 2d ed p. 587, was under consideration,
the Secretary of the Interior said, p. 556: 'When
do rights under the selection become vested~ In
the disposition of the public lands of the United
States, under the laws relating thereto, it is
settled law: (1) That when a party has complied
with all the terms and conditions necessary to
the securing of title to a particular tract of land,
he acquires a vested interest therein, is regarded
as the equitable owner thereof, and thereafter the
govern1nent holds the legal title in trust for him;
(2) that the right to a patent, once vested, is,
for most purposes, equivalent to a patent issued,
and when in fact issued, the patent relates back
to the tin1e when the right to it became fixed: and
(3) that the conditions with respect to the state
or character of the land, as they exist at the time
when all the necessary requirernents have been
complied with b~~ a person seeking title, determine
the question whether the land is subject to sale or
otlwr disposal, and no change in such conditions,
subsequently occurring, can iinpair or in any
1nanner affect his rights.' ~-\_gain. p. 560: 'These
establi~hed principles, in the opinion of the Depa.rtnwnt. are applicable to selections under the
Act of ,June 4, 1S97. The act clearly contemplates
an eJ.xhallpc of cquica.lents. Such is the wzmis-
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takable import of its terms. In the case of relinquishment of patented lands, title is to be given
by the government for title received.' And again p.
564: 'It would be strange indeed if, by the latter
Act, Congress intended that one who accepting
the government's offer of exchange, relinquishes
a tract to which he has obtained full title in a
forest reservation, and in lieu thereof selects a
tract of land which, at the time, is vacant and
open to settlement, and does all that is required
of him to complete the selection and to perfect
the exchange, should there by acquire only an
inchoate right to the selected tract, liable to be
defeated by subsequent discoveries of mineral at
any time before patent, or before final action
upon the selection by the Land Department. Such
a construction would not only tend to defeat the
objects for which the act was passed, by discouraging owners of lands in forest reservations
from giving up their titles, but would be against
both the letter and spirit of the Act. Parties would
be slow indeed to relinquish the.ir complete titles
if it were once understood that they could obtain
only do~tbtful or contingent rights in return fo1·
them. It could not have been the ~ntention of
Congress that parties accept.ing the government's
offer of exchange should be embarrassed by any
such conditions of doubt and uncertainty. * * *"'
"The only exception to the general rule before
stated respecting the time as of which the character of the land-whether mineral or nonmineralis to be determined js one which, in principle and
practice, is confined to railroad land grants. From
the beginning the Land Department, by reason of
the terms of those grants and the restrictive interpretation to which they are subjected, uniformly has constr11ed and treated them as requiring
that the character of the land be determined as of
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the time when the patents issue. * * *Barden vs.
Northern Pacific Railroad Company, 154 U. S.
288. * * *Plainly the decision in that case is without bearing here, save as it recognizes that rights
under other land laws are to be tested by a
different rule. * * *."

!

"And it is further significance that this court
has recognized that the legislation of Congress
designed to aid the common schools of the states
is to be construed liberally rather than restrictively. * * *
It results that the SecretarY erred in matter
of law in rejecting the selecti~n, and that the
District Court rightly entered a decree for the
defendants."
In my mind it is perfectly plain that the real
authority and duties of the Interior Department are
unambiguously pointed out in the case of \Yyoming vs.
United States, supra, and that there is nothing therein
or in the law contained that in any,,ise contemplates
that the Commissioner of the General Land Office or
the Secretary of the Interior should or have the right to
demand that the State wai,~e to the lTnited States any
rninerals presu1ned to exist in a selected tract as a condition precedent to the approval of the selection, where
the State has completely c01nplied with the law and
rules and regulations of the departinent relating to the
relinquishrnent of its titled tract and the selection of a
tract in lieu thereof. There is no burden cast upon the
state to prove be~~ond question tlw nonn1ineral character
of the selected lands. As unrnistakeably pointed out by
the Suprmne Court of the lTnited States, when the State
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has done all that it is required to do in relinquishing its
school tract in place and selecting another tract therefor~
the department has no alternative but to approve the
list without exacting or imposing upon the State conditions not contained in the law. With the selection in
question we are not concerned with the question of
minerals subsequently discovered, but we are concerned
with the rule or principle of law announced by the Supreme Court of the United States that when the State
has fully performed all of the things or acts required
of it in the relinquishment and selection and furnished
its proofs specified, the department has no option to
exercise but is charged with the judicial duty of merely
ascertaining whether the State's relinquishment and
selection meet the requirements of the Congressional
proposal. If that is true then the department must
approve the selection. The Wyoming case, supra, was
prosecuted primarily upon the power of the Land Department to demand a waiver of minerals in the selected
land. The decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in that case, above quoted in part, clearly established that the requirement of the Land Department was
unauthorized in law and void.
It is probably appropriate here to consider what
effect, if any, the provisions of the rnineral school
land-grant Act of 1927, (84 Stats. 1026) has upon the
relinquishment of school sections in place included in
reservations and the selection of other lands in lieu
thereof. By the act the several grants to the States of
numbered school sections in place for the support of
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the public schools is extended to embrace numbered school
sections mineral in character. The school land indemnity
act gives the States the right to select nonrninerallands
upon relinquishment of numbered school sections in
reservations. The school land indemnity Act, however,
was in consonance with the settled policy of Congress
relating to the disposal of known mineral lands, United
States vs. Sweet, supra. This policy, however, was
changed by the provisions of the Act of January 25,
1927, whereby numbered school sections in place of
known mineral character passed to the States under
their respective grants. Under this changed policy of
Congress, it is only reasonable to conclude that Congress
intended, by the Act of January 25, 1927, that the school
land indemnity Act should be modified accordingly and
that the States would have the right to select mineral
lands from the unappropriated public don1ain within their
borders in place of its mineral numbered school sections.
This conclusion is strengthened by the ruling of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Wyoming vs. United States, supra, that the legislation of
Congress designed to aid the conunon schools of the
States is to be construed liberally rather than restrictively and by the further fad that the Interior Department has held that the acts of Congress permitting
exchanges conten1plates the exchange of equivalents.
While the act of June :2. 1910 (36 Stats. 5S3) a5
amended by the act of April 30, 1912 (37 Stats. 105)
gives the Secretary of the Interior the power to accept
waivers of coal in lands selected, still those arts are
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not binding upon the States and do not in anywise fix
or limit the rights of the States in the selection of
such lands.
The next question to consider is whether or not you
have express authority under State statutes to waive or
relinquish the absolute rights of the State in and to its
school lands; that is, have you the power and authority
to waive to the Federal Government the coal or other
minerals in lands selected to replace numbered school
sections relinquished. By the provisions of Section 5575,
Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, as amended by Laws of
1925, page 52, you are given the direction, management
and control of all lands heretofore granted or which may
be hereafter granted to the State by the Federal Government, with power to sell or lease the same for the best
interests of the State. By the provisions of Sections 5577
and 5580 you are authorized to make all necessary
selections of lands under the various grants from the
Federal Government to the State, and to take such action
as shall be necessary to secure the approval of the
proper officers of the United States and the final transfer to this state of the lands selected. By the provisions
of Sections 5575 and 5575X all coal and other mineral
deposits in lands belonging to the State are reserved to
the State and can be disposed of only on a rental and
c royalty basis. By the provisions of Section 5575X1 all
applications to purchase lands of the State shall be
subject to the reservation to the State of all coal and
. other mineral deposits, and by the provisions of Section
; 5575X2 all sales of State lands shall be subject to the
reserved mineral rights.
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A careful reading of Title 101, Sections 5571 to 5681,
inclusive, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, as amended by
Laws of 1921 and 1925, fails to disclose any power or
authority, expressed or implied, in the State Land
Board to waive minerals to the Federal Government
as a condition precedent to the approval of a selection
by the Secretary of the Interior or as an inducement
to the Secretary of the Interior to approve such selection.
The power given the State Land Board "to take such
action as shall be necessary to secure approval of the
proper officers of the Lnited States and the final transfer to this State of lands selected" merely means that
the State Land Board shall do all that is required under
existing law to be done in order to effect the relinquishment and selection, and does not give any power and
authority to accept in exchange for school lands in place
included in a reservation lands of lesser acreage, or
lesser value, or a part of the selected lands, that is. a
mere surface right, a split title, - or all of said selected
lands except certain 1ninerals ; in other words there is no
law giving the State Land Board power to \Yaive coal
or other minerals to the Federal Govermnent in lands
selected for school lands in place. The word "lands" as
used in the laws here in question has been judicially
construed to include "not only the surface of the earth
but ever~·thing under or over it.'' Garnsey Coal Company
vs. Mudd, 281 Fed. 43, Sox Ys. l\Iiracle, 160 N.W. 716.
Walpole vs. State Board of Land Conunissioners, 163
Pac. 848.
Right here H is interesting to note Chapter 56 Laws
of 1927, hy the provisions of which the legislature au-
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thorized the State Land Board to convey to the United
States title to certain lands in the vicinity of the mouth
of Bear River and comprising a part of the bed of Great
Salt Lake upon the condition that all minerals therein
be reserved to the State. Such condition is indicative
of the determination of the legislature to safeguard the
minerals of the State. I cannot find that the legislature
has ever authorized any State Land Board to waive
minerals to the United States in lands selected, but since
the year 1919, when the State mineral-reservation Act
became effective, it has been the policy of the State
to reserve all minerals to itself, and to dispose of them
only by lease.
In view of the remarks herein above contained it
is clear that it is my opinion, and I hold, that the State
Land Board is without authority of law to waive coal
or other minerals to the United States in lands selected
to take the place of numbered school sections in reservations. I am further of the opinion, and so hold, that the
Secretary of the Interior is without right under the
Federal laws and cases hereinabove mentioned to demand
of the State as a condition precedent to the approval of
the selection list that the State waive the coal or other
minerals in the land selected by the State. If the State
has done all that it is required to do under the law in
connection with the selection here in question, then as
stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in
the case of Wyoming vs. United States, supra, the department has only the judicial duty to determine that
question and if it finds that the State has thus complied
with the law it must approve the selection.
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I suggest that the matter be presented to the Interior
Department in the light of the views expressd in this
opinion.
Yours very respectfully,
jsj George P. Parker
Attorney General
6x-G

APPEXDIX
THE STATE OF UTAH
OFFICE OF THE ATTORXEY GEXER~ll
SALT LAKE CITY
February 6, 1935
(SEAL)

Joseph Chez
Attorney General
John D. Rice
S. D. Huffaker
Grover A. Giles
Ralph S. Calder
Deputies

Hon. George A. Fisher, Executive Secretary
State Land Board
Building
Dear Mr. Fisher:
I acknowledge receipt of your letter of February 4,
1935, in which you state that the Land Board is con·
sidering the exchange of a large acreage of school lands
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xvn
for public domain lands, with a view of consolidating
the State's holdings, as authorized by the Taylor Grazing
Act. You desire to know if it is necessary to have any
new legislation in order to accomplish this grouping of
lands.
Under the provisions of Section 86-1-58, Revised
Statutes of Utah, 1933, the Land Board is authorized to
exchange any of the State lands for other lands of equal
value. This section, however, provides:
"That no exchange shall be made by the land
board until a patent for the land so received in
exchange shall have been issued to such proprietors or their grantors."
This section should be amended permitting exchanges
with the United States Government in accordance with
the terms of the Taylor Act.
I also call your attention to the fact that under our
present laws you are required to reserve all mineral
rights when disposing of State lands. It is not likely that
the Government would consent to such a reservation
in the exchange of lands as contemplated by you, and
for this reason I would suggest that the law be amended
authorizing you to make such exchanges with the United
States Government without mineral reservation, providing, of course, that the Government does not reserve
mineral rights to the lands granted by it in such an
exchange.
Difficulties may arise with the various State institutions regarding these exchanges, and in some instances
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it may be necessary to get the consent of the institutions
in order to make such exchanges. These rna tters, however,
can be taken care of as they arise.
Most respectfully yours,
jsj Joseph Chez
Attorney General
8:EL
THE STATE OF -cTAH
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEXERAL
SALT LAKE CITY
June 1, 1951
(SEAL)
Mr. Robert H. Ruggeri
Ti tie Examiner
State Land Board
Building
Dear Mr. Ruggeri:
This is in response to your request. for an opinion
from this office of the follo"ing Inatters dealing with
the disposition of state lands:
(1) May the Land Board agree with the
Federal Govern1nent not to issue prospecting and
Inining leases on state lands already leased to
the Federal Govern1nent for other pui·poses?

( 2) If the Land Board is surressful in eff('et ing an exehange of lands with the Federal
Governn1ent, can the Land Board transfer the
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fee, or would it be required to reserve the mineral
rights in this exchange~
As you are aware, under the provisions of Title 86,
Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended, the Land Board
has been vested with the direction, management and
control of all state lands. Any disposition of state lands,
however, must be in accordance with the Constitution
and laws of the State of Utah.
With reference to your first question, it is our
opinion that the Land Board may agree with the Federal
Government not to issue prospecting and mining leases
on lands already leased to the Federal Government for
other purposes should it be the judgment of the board
that such agreement would best subserve the interests
of the State.
While Section 86-1-24 provides, in part, that "The
board shall cause all public lands now owned * * * or
* * * which may hereafter be vested in the state, to be
classified and registered and thereafter sold or leased,"
it is also provided in Section 86-1-18, as amended by
Chapter 84, Laws of Utah 1945, and Chapter 129, Laws
of Utah 1947, that "The board may lease for prospecting
and mining purposes any portions of the unsold, unleased
lands of the State * * *."
In interpreting similar discretionary power conferred upon the Land Board with reference to the sale
of state lands, our Supreme Court held in Miles v. Wells,
22 Utah 55, 61 Pac. 534, that a court had no jurisdiction
to direct by mandamus how this discretionary power
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should be exercised. In the course of its opinion the
court said:
The language of Sec. 16, in this regard, is,
"The board may select ~nd contract to sell" etc.
Therefore unless the term "may" is clearly shown
by context of said section or by other provisions
of the act to have been used in the sense of must,
or if by giving to it that meaning other provisions
of the statute would be neutralized, then the natural and ordinary meaning of that word must control, and said board may at their option, select and
contract to sell the lands donated to the State, and
applied for by a citizen, or refrain from doing so.
There are no provisions of the statute which
indicate that that term was used in any other
than its ordinary sense. To have done so would
have neutralized the plain provisions of some, and
materially modiifed others, of the sections of the
statute hereinbefore cited.
With reference to your second question, we are of
the opinion that the board is not authorized to effect an
exchange of lands ·with Federal Go\ernment without a
reservation of all coal and other nrinerals. \Y e have not
been able to find any express or implied authority for
the Land Board to effect an exchange of lands except that
contained in Section 86-1-58. which provides as follows:
In order to cmnpact, as far as practicable,
the land holdings of the state, the board is hereby
authorized to exchange any of the land held by
the state for other land of equal Yalue within the
~tate held by other proprietors: and upon request
of the board the goYernor is herebY authorized
to <'xeentP and deliYer the necessar~T patents to
such otlwr proprietors and receive tl1erefrom
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proper deeds of the lands so exchanged ; provided,
that no exchange shall be made by the land board
until a patent for the land so received in exchange shall have been issued to such proprietors
or their grantors.
The Land Board has been vested with the authority
embodied in this section since the enactment of Section
45, Chapter XXXVII, Laws of Utah, 1897.
In 1919, however, pursuant to the provisions of
Chapter 107, Laws of Utah 1919, the Legislature made
an outright reservation to the state of all coal and other
minerals deposited in lands belonging to the state and
also provided that all applications to purchase state
lands subsequent thereto be subject to such a reservation.
In making the aforesaid reservation the Legislature made
no distinction between "sales" and "exchanges" of state
lands, but went on to provide how such deposits should
be disposed of. These same provisions are now embodied
substantially in Sections 86-1-15 and 86-1-16 Utah Code
Annotated 1943.
A strict interpretation of the language of Section
86-1-58, supra, would permit an exchange of lands \vith
the Federal Government only as to those lands for which
a patent has been issued and which had thereafter been
reacquired by the Federal Government. We believe, however, that a reasonable construction of the language,
in order to effectuate its manifest purpose, would per:mit
an exchange of lands with the Federal Government, even
as to unpatented lands as long as the title thereto was
still vested in the Federal Government. The exchange
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would necessarily have to be in accordance with and subject to the limitations of Section 86-1-58.
In view of the foregoing legislative mandates, it is
the opinion of this office that any exchange of state lands
with the Federal Government must be under and pur.
suant to the provisions of Section 86-1-58 to "compact,
as far as practicable, the land holdings of the state" and
also subject to a reservation to the state of all coal and
other minerals.
Very truly yours,
/s/ Clinton D. ,~ernon
CLIXTOX D. VERXOX
Attorney General
THE ST.A.TE OF l-TA.H
OFFICE OF THE A.TTORXEY GEXERAL
SALT L~~KE CITY
December 6, 1954
(SEAL)
E. R. Callister
Attorney General
State Land Board
Building
REQUESTED BY:

Joseph P. 1frCarthy. Title E:xaininer, State Land Board.

OPINION BY:

E. R. Callister, Attorney General;
H. R. 'Valdo, Jr., Assistant Attorne~~ General.
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QUESTIONS:

1. Must the State Land Board, pursuant to Sec. 65-1-15, U.C.A. 1953,
reserve mineral rights (a) in land,
title to which is not vested in the
state and for which a fee simple
title in land is obtained in lieu
thereof or in exchange from the
United States; (b) in land, title to
which has vested in the state in
exchange for which a fee simple
title in other land is obtained from
the United States~
2. May the State Land Board exchange the surface rights in state
land for the surface rights in federally owned land, both the state
and the United States reserving
mineral rights~

CONCLUSIONS:

1.

(a) No.
(b) Yes.

2.

Yes.

The questions involved here arise in a variety of circumstances. The most common situation is where unsurveyed
school sections are included within a federal withdrawal
: or other reservation. In that event the State has the
option of selecting lieu land outside the reservation for
, the school sections lost or awaiting the cancellation or
, extinguishment of the withdrawal or reserve. The ques, tion may also arise where the State is desirous of con-

'r
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solidating its holdings in a block and exchanges state
owned land in one area for federally owned land adjacent
to state owned land in another area. The same situation
may arise where the Federal Government desires a
particular piece of state land for federal use and a trade
is proposed.
Sec. 65-1-15 provides in part:
All coal and other minerals deposited in lands
belonging to the state of Utah are hereby reserved to the state.
This provision is mandatory and self-executing and
gives no discretion to the Land Board. See Attorney
General's opinions of May 10, 1954, No. 54-050, and
April11, 1922.

As noted above, where lieu land is taken for unsurveyed lands included within a federal reservation or withdrawal, the state is entitled to select lands outside the
reservation or withdrawal. in lieu of lands included within
the withdrawal. The sa1ne right is gi\en for land lawfully
occupied by a private person at the time the State·s title
vests. In either case the State is exchanging a potential
title to land within the "ithdrawal for a present title
in fee simple in land outside the withdrawal. It is a
potential title because title to a specific school section
does not vest in the State until a surYey is made and
accepted by the Secretary of the Interior and not then
if the land is included within a federal reservation or
is owned by s01ne priYate person, see U.S. Y. 'Yyoming,
331 U. S. 440. The question of whether the State has any
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interest in an unsurveyed school section so as to prevent
I~ entry thereon by a private person is presently being
~ litigated. The question raised in that case has not been
~ directly considered by any court. Present law would
r indicate that the State cannot successfully assert such
a claim. But even if the State were successful in this
contention, the State would not have any title to the
unsurveyed land for the Federal government could
ill. defeat the State's rights entirely by creating a reservation or withdrawal on such land prior to survey. U. S.
v. Wyoming, supra. It must therefore be held, regardless
~ of the outcome of the litigation, that the State has only
~: a potential title prior to survey. It is, therefore, our
opinion that an unsurveyed school section is not land
"belonging to the state of Utah" within the meaning of
Sec. 65-1-15 so that minerals need not be reserved where
1!:
land is taken in lieu of such unsurveyed land.

>1

This conclusion is strengthened by a consideration
of the purpose of the School Land Indemnity Act of
1891 (43 U.S.C. 851, 853) under which selection of lieu
land is authorized. The act contemplates an exchange of
ffl equivalents (Wyoming v. U. S., 255 U. S. 489), that is,
:~ a complete waiver by the State of all its right to unsurveyed land within a reservation or withdrawal and
the granting therefor of a full fee simple title in land
ll
outside the withdrawal or reservation. The mineral
~~:
reservation law of 1919 ( 65-1-15) was passed when the
ri
Indemnity Act of 1891 had been in effect for many years
~[
and the mechanics of which were well known. Had the
Legislature intended to require a reservation of minerals

!l;
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1n unsurveyed land, no further indemnity land could
be obtained for the "exchange of equivalents" would
never exist. We cannot believe the Legislature intended
such a result.
A different question is presented where title has
passed to the State. In the event the mineral reservation
would, in terms, apply. We can see no way to avoid this
requirement even though in a given case it may operate
to defeat an otherwise proper and advantageous exchange of lands between the State and the Federal
government. This is in accord with an opinion of the
Attorney General of February 6, 1935, but reverses, in
part, the Attorney General's opinion of October 2, 1937.
See also opinion of July 2-±, 1950, #1342.
In answer to your second question, we believe the
general discretion of the Land Board in dealing with
state land authorizes the exchange of surface rights in
state land for surface rights in federally owned land.
See 65-1-14. No conflict with the mineral reservation law
is here involved for minerals are reserved by both the
State and the Federal governn1ent.
Legal principles applicable to both questions here
presented were discussed at length in two opinions of
the Attorney General issued on ~Iarch 11 and ~Iay 28.
1931. The facts of both opinions were the same. rnsurveyed school sections had been ineluded in a forest
reserve and the State had selected certain lands outside
the reserve as inde1nnity for the school sections within
the reserve. rrlw Secretary of Interior refused to approve
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the selection of the particular lands unless the State
would waive its mineral rights to the lands selected. In
holding that the Land Board could not waive mineral
rights in the lands selected, the then Attorney General
made several observations as to the law relating to such
land transactions.
First, he stated that the Secretary of Interior had
no authority to require a waiver of mineral rights and
the Land Board had no authority to waive mineral rights
in selected lands. Under the provisions of the School
Land Indemnity Act of 1891, the State is entitled to
select land not known to be valuable for .mineral and
obtain a fee simple title therefor. The selected land may
contain mineral but if it is not known at the time of the
selection to be valuable for mineral, the State is entitled
to select it. The Attorney General ruled that the only
authority of the Secretary of Interior was to reject the
selection of lands known to be valuable for mineral or
approve the selection of lands not known to be valuable
for mineral, but no authority is given to require a waiver
of mineral rights from the State. We agree with this
conclusion. Wyoming v. U. S., 255 U. S. 489; Brigham
City v. Rich, 34 Utah 130.
Second, the Attorney General ruled that "land"
meant a fee simple title. The Land Board is only authorized to select "land" and, therefore, the Land Board
may not select the surface of a piece of land and waive
the mineral rights for they would not then be selecting
"land." This result and the legal principle is correct,
where a selection is made under the School Land In-
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demnity Act, but it can have no application to exchanges
of land. The Land Board by Sec. 65-1-14 is given "the
direction, management and control of all lands heretofore
or hereafter granted to this state." By Sec. 65-1-15 it is
authorized to lease minerals; by 65-1-18 to lease for
prospecting; by 65-1-29 to sell land; by 65-1-34 to sell
timber. In other words the Land Board has the same
authority to act as any private land owner subject,
however, to its trust obligations. If it is advantageous
to the State to exchange the surface of state-owned lands
for the surface of federally owned lands, the State and
the United States reserving mineral rights to themselves,
there should be, and, in our opinion, is no legal objection
to consummating such exchange. \\Te do not disagree
with the results of the opinions of ~Iarch 11 and May
28, 1931. Some of the discussion of the legal principles
involved were stated more broadly than necessary and
should be limited to the particular fact situation discussed in those opinions.
For the foregoing reasons it is our opinion that the
Land Board n1ust reserve mineral rights in land, title
to which has vested in the State. but not in land, title
to which has not yested in the State. It is further our
opinion that the Land Board n1ay exchange the surface
rights in state land for the surface rights in federally
owned land.
Y ery truly yours.
/s/ E. R. Callister
E. R. CALLISTER

Attorney General
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